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DLD-136

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 16-3893
____________
CURRY ROBINSON,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT HOUTZDALE SCI;
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
VINCENT DEFELICE, Unit Manager;
SHANNON SAGE, Activities Manager
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 16-cv-00044)
District Judge: Kim R. Gibson
__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 16, 2017
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 6, 2017)
____________
OPINION
____________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Curry Robinson appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his
amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that
follow, we will summarily affirm.
Robinson, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution in Houtzdale,
Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, against the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), John E. Wetzel, Superintendent Kenneth Cameron, Unit Manager Vincent
DeFelice, and Activities Manager Shannon Sage. In his amended complaint, Robinson
alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, et seq., his First Amendment Free Exercise rights
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Specifically, Robinson alleged
that he was unable to participate in the sex offender’s treatment program at SCIHoutzdale because it requires him to “confess” to a therapist. Robinson, a Christian,
claimed that the Bible does not permit him to confess his sins to anyone other than God
and thus the requirements of the program substantially burden his religious rights.
Moreover, because he cannot participate in the program, he cannot reap its benefits,
which include a transfer to be closer to his family and “privileged blocks/status.”
Robinson asserted that he grieved the program policy on this ground and on the ground
that the policy already “allows a given group to be comprised of 20% deniers.” He
alleged that, when he met with defendant DeFelice to discuss his grievance, DeFelice told
him to “set aside his religious beliefs.” With respect to his equal protection claim,
Robinson alleged that a DOC policy allows inmates to spend up to $500 dollars for the
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purchase of a guitar, while inmates seeking to purchase a keyboard are limited by both
the amount they may spend and the options available for purchase. Robinson complained
that the policy “permits racially profiling and bias by allowing disparity to those who are
African American who predominantly play keyboard….” Robinson sought injunctive
relief only.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) and attached Robinson’s grievances as exhibits. They argued that dismissal of
the amended complaint was proper on the basis of lack of personal involvement in the
actual alleged constitutional and statutory violations. In the alternative, the defendants
argued that Robinson failed to state a claim under either RLUIPA or the First
Amendment. They argued generally that Robinson had not made sufficient allegations
regarding either the elements of the sex offender program which allegedly burdened his
practice of the Christian religion, or the particular aspects of his religious beliefs or
practices which were substantially burdened by the program. They noted that Robinson
had not been asked to “confess” or “to make a confession” in any religious sense,
although they acknowledged that, were he to participate in the program, he would have to
admit responsibility for his offenses. With respect to the equal protection claim, the
defendants argued that Robinson failed to allege that he was subjected to intentional
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, or national origin.
Robinson submitted a brief in opposition to dismissal of his amended complaint,
in which he argued, among other things, that his allegations were sufficient to survive
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because RLUIPA protects him from having to “modify his
behavior [by] ‘confessing guilt’ to someone other than God [ ] in order to obtain the same
3

benefits that other inmates received when they did say they were responsible.” Plaintiff’s
Brief in Opposition to Dismissal, at 4. He also asserted that he continued to be interested
in participating in the sex offender treatment program at SCI-Houtzdale and thus that his
claim was not time-barred, and he reiterated that the DOC’s own policy permits any
given treatment group to be made up of “20% deniers,” id. at 5, suggesting that the prison
could accommodate his religious beliefs.
Following the completion of briefing, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and
Recommendation, in which she concluded that Robinson’s amended complaint should be
dismissed. With respect to the defendants’ lack of personal involvement argument, the
Magistrate Judge correctly noted that Robinson alleged that Secretary Wetzel and
Superintendent Cameron were liable as policymakers, and liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 may be imposed on an official with final policymaking authority, see McGreevy v.
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven one decision by a school
superintendent, if s/he were a final policymaker, would render his or her decision district
policy” and subject him or her to liability under § 1983). Nevertheless, the Magistrate
Judge concluded, Robinson had failed to state a claim against any of the defendants under
either RLUIPA, the First Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Magistrate Judge reviewed the standards applicable to First Amendment
claims, including the factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and the
standards applicable to claims under RLUIPA, see Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860
(2015). The Magistrate Judge properly noted that RLUIPA provides greater protection to
plaintiffs, and that, under RLUIPA, the burden is on the prison to show that its policy
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“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
The Magistrate Judge then based her conclusion on the threshold “substantial burden”
issue, concluding that Robinson had not stated a plausible claim that the sex offender
treatment program’s requirement that an inmate admit the facts of his offense had a
serious effect on the exercise of his Christian religion. Specifically, she agreed with the
defendants that Robinson had not been asked to “confess” or to “make a confession” in
any religious sense. Rather, in the “Sex Offender Candidacy Evaluation,” he was asked
to describe what occurred in his offense, and notified that, if he agreed to participate in
the Sex Offender Therapeutic Community (SOPTC), he would have to assume full
responsibility for the aforementioned offense. The Magistrate Judge noted further that
Robinson voluntarily chose to not participate in the SOPTC, and, thus, he was not
subjected to any requirements of the program.1
In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, even if Robinson could
show that his religious rights were substantially burdened by the program’s requirements,
courts generally have held that (1) there is a rational connection between a sex offender
treatment program’s requirement that an inmate admit the facts of his offense and take
responsibility for his crime and a state correctional agency’s legitimate penological
interest in rehabilitating sex offenders; and (2) there is no alternative method of
accommodating an inmate’s concern that the admission of guilt in the context of the

We note that Chief Grievance Officer Dorina Varner denied Robinson’s grievance on
this same basis, stating: “You failed to provide any evidence of a substantial burden on
your religious practice.” Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Exhibit 1.
5
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treatment program would violate his religious beliefs, see, e.g., Searcy v. Simmons, 299
F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2002).
The Magistrate Judge rejected Robinson’s equal protection claim on the ground
that all inmates who are similarly situated are treated alike under the DOC policy at issue,
in that an inmate who wishes to purchase a guitar is treated the same as all other inmates
who seek to purchase a guitar, and an inmate who wishes to purchase a keyboard is
treated the same as all other inmates who seek to purchase a keyboard. Furthermore, the
Magistrate Judge concluded, Robinson had failed to allege that the defendants engaged in
any intentional prohibited discrimination against inmates who wish to purchase
keyboards.
Robinson filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, and he included
with his Objections some suggestions for how prison officials could accommodate his
religious beliefs. In an order entered on September 26, 2016, the District Court dismissed
Robinson’s amended complaint with prejudice and adopted the Report and
Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court.
Robinson appeals. Our Clerk granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and
advised him that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) or summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He was
invited to submit argument in writing, but he has not done so.
We will summarily affirm. Summary action is appropriate where no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Review of
a District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is
plenary. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the factual allegations contained
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in the amended complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A
motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The threshold question in any First Amendment or RLUIPA case is whether the
prison's challenged policy or practice has substantially burdened the practice of the
inmate-plaintiff’s religion. See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277-78 (3d Cir.
2007). In his Objections to the Report and Recommendation, Robinson attempted to cure
the deficiencies in his allegation of a substantial burden on his practice of Christianity, as
follows:
The Plaintiff [sic] belief as a Christian is not personalized in order to fit
some desire to undermined [sic] the system of Government that God
allowed to exist. (Rom. 13:1-3)[.] However, the line is drawing [sic] when
there is a conflict with what man say the Plaintiff must do, versus what God
says in his word. (Acts. 4:19-20). The Bible does not teach to be rebellious
against authority, but pray for our leaders and aid in the endeavors of
righteousness and lawful living. However, Confession is and [sic]
foundational precept of mustly [sic] every Christian branch of believers.
As a Christian may [sic] confession is connected to my salvation and
repentance of sins, whether it broke a law of the land or not. (Rom.
10:10)[.] The from [sic] this confession is not just Spiritual but of the soul
also from dead thought which lead me to actions (Mt. 15:19). The SOPTC
may call this red flag; awful’s.
Objections to Report and Recommendation, at 10. We have considered fully this
assertion of Robinson’s sincerely held beliefs about confession but are compelled to
agree with the Magistrate Judge and District Court that no plausible First Amendment or
RLUIPA claim is stated. Robinson’s amended complaint and other submissions do not
reveal “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
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of the necessary elements of” a claim for relief, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), and thus dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper.2
We also uphold dismissal of Robinson’s equal protection claim. To state an equalprotection claim, Robinson must allege intentional discrimination. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). It is not enough for him to allege that he is African American
and that the prison has different policies relating to the purchase of guitars versus
keyboards. Rather, race must have been a substantial factor in that different treatment.
See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Davis, 426
U.S. at 235). Robinson’s allegations fall well short of this “substantial factor”
requirement.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
dismissing Robinson’s amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
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Because we uphold the order of the District Court on this basis, we need not address the
Magistrate Judge’s alternative determination that there is a rational connection between
the program’s requirement that an inmate admit the facts of his offense and the DOC’s
legitimate penological interest in rehabilitating sex offenders; and that there is no
alternative method of accommodating an inmate’s concern that the admission of guilt in
the context of the treatment program would violate his religious beliefs.
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